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REGULATORY HORCRUXES
SARAH E. LIGHT†
ABSTRACT
The regulator that designs and first implements a federal regulatory
program does not always have the ability to control the timing and
process of how that regulatory program will, in this Symposium’s
language, “exit.” As the 2016 election has demonstrated, the initiating
regulator cannot necessarily plan in advance for the program’s
expiration, diminution, or scaling back. A successor instead wields this
power. Whether one views this as a terrible thing or a salutary feature
of democracy depends in part upon one’s relationship to the regulatory
status quo, but also implicates broader questions about policy stability
and democratic accountability. At the very least, however, this fact
raises several important questions about strategic regulatory design.
First, is it possible to insulate or harden regulatory programs from
successor exit? And second, when, if ever, would this be a good thing?
This Article offers a systematic account of how regulators can make
regulatory exit more challenging by looking outward, beyond the walls
of a single, primary federal agency to other potential regulators or coregulators, including secondary federal agencies, the states, and private
actors.
This Article identifies as a potential antidote to regulatory exit a
constellation of strategic techniques that I call regulatory horcruxes—
much like the horcruxes Lord Voldemort created by placing portions
of his soul into multiple external objects in order to ensure his
immortality.1 An initiating regulator, be it Congress or a federal agency,
can use such horcruxes in an effort to make successor exit more difficult
by splitting programs beyond the walls of a single federal agency into
other institutions. This Article first offers an analytical framework
laying out five primary types of horcrux. It then examines horcruxes
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from a normative perspective, evaluating the comparative benefits and
costs of their use in terms of their potential impact both on the
durability of regulatory programs and on the quality of democratic
deliberation. It acknowledges that horcruxes are an imperfect solution.
Although dispersal or fragmentation of regulatory authority may
insulate a program from deregulatory pressure, the fragmented
regulatory program may exist in a weakened form that cannot
accomplish as much as more direct, centralized regulation can. The
Article concludes by offering a research agenda, including suggestions
for further empirical research.
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INTRODUCTION
J.B. Ruhl and Jim Salzman have called for legislators and
regulators to think more comprehensively about regulatory “exit,”
which they define as “the intentional, significant reduction in
governmental intervention initiated at a particular time under specified
processes and conditions.”2 They offer a taxonomy of different types

2. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulatory Exit, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1302 (2015)
(emphasis omitted). Exit includes not only complete termination of a program, but other, less
drastic steps, such as diminution or scaling back of a program, or reducing the number of
beneficiary classes, for example. Id. For the seminal theoretical account of exit, see ALBERT O.
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of exit, ranging from one embedded into a regulatory program ex ante
with concrete and transparent legal rules either for the government or
a party to exit, to a “messy” form, which occurs ex post and lacks such
clear rules.3 Normatively, exit is good if regulatory goals have been
achieved, or if scarce resources could be better devoted to other
problems; however, exit is problematic if there remains work to be
done.4 They conclude that initiating “legislatures and agencies should
explicitly consider exit at the creation of new regulatory programs.”5
No matter what kind of exit strategy initiating regulators build into
a specific regulatory program ex ante, however, there always remains
the possibility that a successor administration will exit based on
background legal rules.6 In other words, despite Ruhl and Salzman’s
useful framework and prescriptive conclusion, even if a statute or
regulatory scheme clearly spells out all of the conditions for exit in
advance, certain background legal rules exist that permit a successor to
end or amend a regulatory program. Congress can repeal or amend a
statute pursuant to Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution.7 An agency
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). The concept of regulatory exit is distinct from the idea,
elaborated upon by Charles Tiebout, that a mobile citizenry has the power to “exit” one
jurisdiction and move to another when policies are adopted that do not meet the citizen’s
preferences. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
3. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 2, at 1302–03.
4. Id. at 1309–11.
5. Id. at 1325.
6. This question of fidelity to the enacting coalition’s wishes is central to the so-called
delegation problem within administrative law, namely the tension between the delegation of
authority to agencies whose personnel are unelected and the exercise of political control by
elected principals in Congress and the president. Although the literature addressing this tension
is too voluminous to cite, for a few examples discussing these issues both theoretically and
empirically, see generally Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast,
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987)
[hereinafter McNollgast, Administrative Procedures]; Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll &
Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and
the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989) [hereinafter, McNollgast, Structure
and Process]; David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative
Agencies, 28 J. LEG. STUD. 413 (1999) (noting a lack of empirical testing of the “structure and
process” theory). This question also arises in the literature on “coalitional drift,” which examines
“the influence of subsequent political coalitions on the development and administration of the
law.” Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative Arrangements and
the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative
Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 499 (1989) (distinguishing coalitional drift from
the bureaucratic drift that is central to the delegation problem). For further discussion on these
two forms of drift, see infra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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can repeal or amend a regulation pursuant to the notice-and-comment
procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.8 If the
regulation is recent enough, Congress and the president can revoke it
pursuant to the Congressional Review Act (CRA).9 And there are
numerous informal ways to reduce program resources, including by
slashing agency budgets, reassigning staff, declining to enforce a
regulatory program, or seeking delays in the courts.10 Of course, there
are both legal and political costs associated with these types of
deregulatory actions. But these formal and informal background
mechanisms nonetheless exist, and therefore must be accounted for in
any theory of exit.
This potential for successor exit raises a set of complex questions.
First, against the backdrop of these default legal rules, is it possible to
insulate or harden a regulatory program against premature successor
exit? Second, when, if ever, would such insulation be a good thing?11
Some scholars have examined the strategies that federal agencies can
employ internally to insulate their actions from presidential,
congressional, or judicial control during particular phases of political
cycles, such as in the lame duck period after an election.12 Others have

8. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983).
9. See Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012) (granting Congress a 60-day
period in which to review rulemakings and pass a joint resolution of disapproval, which, with
presidential signature, not only repeals an existing rule, but also purports to preclude the agency
from promulgating a rule in the future on the same subject matter). Prior to the 2016 election, the
CRA had been used only once. In the first months of the Trump administration, the CRA was
used fourteen times to overturn regulations adopted at the end of the Obama administration. Of
those fourteen regulations, four related to energy and the environment. Three were regulations
adopted by the Department of Interior (DOI) relating to resource management planning,
wildlife, and stream protection. One was a regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) requiring the disclosure of payments to foreign governments by entities involved in
resource extraction. Congressional Review Act FAQs, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
https://www.gao.gov/legal/congressional-review-act/faq [https://perma.cc/32ZR-V5NU].
10. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2009) (“[W]hat Congress and the
President give, they can just as easily take away.”); Jonathan Remy Nash, J.B. Ruhl & James
Salzman, The Production Function of the Regulatory State: How Much Do Agency Budgets
Matter?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 695 (2017) (noting that the Trump administration proposed to slash
the budget of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by 25 percent).
11. Cf. Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1158, 1206 (arguing that laws addressing climate change
should be designed to include asymmetric “‘precommitment strategies’ that deliberately make it
hard (but never impossible) to change the law” in an anti-environmental direction in response to
short-term economic or other interest group pressures (footnote omitted)).
12. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before
a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 589–93, 606–10 (2003) (examining techniques
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examined how institutional design—for example, the design of
independent agencies—can insulate them from short-term interest
group capture to promote long-term public welfare based on
expertise.13 The “structure and process” thesis of Matthew McCubbins,
Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast (McNollgast) posits that Congress
uses authorizing legislation ex ante to embed structures and procedures
into agency decisionmaking in ways that can favor substantive
outcomes.14 In other words, regulatory and legislative design can
“stack[] the deck” in favor of the coalition that enacted the original
regulatory program and against “bureaucratic drift.”15 Murray Horn,
Jonathan Macey, and Kenneth Shepsle expand this logic, arguing that
an enacting coalition must be mindful of shifting preferences not only
within the agency vis-à-vis the enacting coalition, but also of the
shifting preferences of political actors outside the agency.16 In their
including midnight rulemaking, hiring, and promotions before a presidential transition); Jennifer
Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1782–1803
(2013) (examining strategies that allow agencies to increase the cost of presidential review when
agency and presidential preferences diverge); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and
Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 471, 474–75 (2011) (empirically examining agency
rulemaking in the face of presidential, congressional, and judicial transitions). Notably, Richard
Lazarus offers menus of both internal design strategies and some external ones to create
asymmetric precommitments favoring climate policy. See Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1206, 1209–
31 (suggesting “interagency, scientific advisory, and stakeholder consultation requirements . . . ;
statutory and regulatory hammers . . . ; federal preemption and non-preemption triggers . . . ; and
limited and enhanced judicial review provisions” among others (emphasis omitted)).
13. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18–19 (2010) (noting that the problem of capture by one-sided interest
group pressure exists in many policy areas, and focusing on consumer protection); McNollgast,
Administrative Procedures, supra note 6, at 253–64; McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note
6, at 435–45; Spence, supra note 6, at 415–16 (discussing structure and process hypothesis); cf.
David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential
Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 34 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 377, 379 (2004) (concluding that independent agencies are effectively insulated from
presidential control and will have a longer expected duration).
14. See McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 6, at 435–45.
15. See McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 6, at 253–64; McNollgast,
Structure and Process, supra note 6, at 435–45. But see David B. Spence, Administrative Law and
Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG.
407, 424–25 (1997) (arguing that the procedural control arguments are “weak” because empirical
studies have demonstrated that opponents of the “enacting coalition” can likewise benefit from
neutral procedures like notice and comment).
16. Horn & Shepsle, supra note 6, at 499 (arguing that managing coalitional drift and
bureaucratic drift involves tradeoffs); Jonathan Macey, Organizational Design and the
Administrative Control of Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 93–94, 108–09 (1992) (questioning
the significance of the tradeoff between bureaucratic and coalitional drift, and arguing that both
can be addressed through design of “who an agency represents,” such as through the creation of
a “a single-industry regulatory agency,” or through inter-agency competition over jurisdiction);
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view, the enacting coalition must guard not only against “bureaucratic
drift,” which is the classic principal-agent problem that agency
bureaucrats will stray from the principal’s wishes when implementing
policy, but also against “coalitional drift,” namely “the influence of
subsequent political coalitions on the development and administration
of the law.”17 It is the latter concern that is more salient in the context
of a new, deregulatory coalition.
This Article closely examines what happens when regulators and
legislators look outward beyond the walls of a single, primary federal
agency to embed features of regulatory programs, or entire programs,
in other potential regulators or co-regulators: other federal agencies,
the states, and private, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It
identifies a constellation of techniques—regulatory horcruxes—that
have the potential to render successor exit more challenging through
decentralization or fragmentation of regulatory authority. It then
examines the comparative benefits and costs of their use.18 These

Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A Comment on
Macey, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 111, 114–15 (1992) (arguing that the enacting coalition seeks to
optimize the balance between protecting against each of these types of drift).
17. Horn & Shepsle, supra note 6, at 499, 503 (noting that the enacting coalition “cannot
constrain private interests and future coalitions from tampering with an enacted agreement”).
18. This Article thus builds and expands upon legal scholarship examining the extent to
which regulatory programs that are shared across multiple federal agencies or embedded within
secondary agencies, and situations in which agencies can “check and balance” one another’s
decisions under different regulatory programs, are more “durable” than other regulatory
programs or promote other values like better decisionmaking. These studies tend to focus on
shared regulatory space or regulatory redundancy across multiple agencies within the federal
government. E.g., Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 IND. L.J. 1239,
1264 (2014) (discussing “embedded” environmental law as programs with environmental goals
housed in federal agencies other than the EPA); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination
in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (2012) (focusing on coordination
challenges of shared regulatory space across federal agencies and advocating presidential
control); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006) (focusing on “checks and balances” across
federal agencies in the foreign affairs context); Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort,
Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior, 30 RAND J. ECON. 232, 233–34, 257 (1999)
(arguing, based on economic modeling, that “[t]he separation of regulators may be an optimal
organizational response to the threat of capture,” but focusing on different regulatory programs
housed in different agencies rather than single regulatory programs); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Agencies
in Conflict: Overlapping Agencies and the Legitimacy of the Administrative Process, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 101, 101, 102 n.3, 113 (1980) (discussing three types of redundancy across federal agencies,
including “blockage, policy interference, and advocacy”); cf. Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 211, 215 (2015) (discussing the informal “pooling” of power across federal
agencies in practice, rather than in formal authority). Regulatory horcruxes include not only
programs shared or split into different federal agencies, but also programs shared or split with the
states and with private actors. In addition, by examining not only shared or overlapping regulatory
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questions of strategic institutional design are especially timely in the
context of the expressly deregulatory stance of both the Trump
administration and the 115th Congress, with their strong focus on
reducing environmental, energy, climate, and natural resource
management standards adopted and enforced by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the
Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Interior
(DOI), and its subcabinet agencies like the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM).19 Because regulatory programs addressing the
environment are the subject of deep divides across partisan lines, and
those federal agencies whose missions are environmental, energy, or
natural resources related are currently in the crosshairs of recent and
ongoing deregulatory efforts,20 the Article examines the concept of
horcruxes through the lens of regulatory programs that affect the
environment.21 And because the primary agency addressing

space, but also regulatory programs that have been fully externalized into secondary federal
agencies and the states with only the threat of their destruction remaining in the central regulator,
the horcrux concept broadens this discussion about regulatory design. Identifying horcruxes as a
single constellation of techniques allows for comparisons of the different forms along common
normative dimensions.
19. Climate Deregulation Tracker, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L.,
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/all-updates
[https://perma.cc/BUE3-ZJ8X] (compiling a list of deregulatory actions in the environmental and
energy space taken since January 2017); see also Nadja Popovich & Livia Albeck-Ripka, 60
Environmental Rules on the Way Out Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/climate/trump-environment-rules-reversed.html
?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9Z6F-89PG].
20. The Trump administration has disbanded scientific advisory committees, notified the
international community of the intent of the United States to withdraw from the Paris Agreement
on Climate Change, issued a proposed rule to repeal the Clean Power Plan, and taken other steps
such as issuing executive orders to reduce regulatory “burdens” like environmental reviews for
infrastructure projects. Agencies including the EPA, the DOE, the DOT, and others have frozen,
delayed, or withdrawn energy efficiency and renewable fuel standards, announced their intention
to revisit vehicle emissions standards, and begun to undertake other deregulatory actions,
especially with respect to climate change. See Climate Deregulation Tracker, supra note 19. Many
scholars have noted that environmental and climate change legislation and regulation are both
difficult to pass and likely to be the subject of deregulatory pressure because regulators and
members of the public are subject to cognitive biases that lead us to prioritize reducing immediate,
monetizable costs in the short-run, rather than hard-to-monetize, diffuse harms in the future,
among other biases. Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1173–79 (discussing myopia bias, among other
biases in the climate context); David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the
Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1316, 1320 (2003) (same).
21. Although this analysis focuses on environmental regulatory programs, the concept of
regulatory horcruxes has broader salience. For example, regulatory horcruxes can exist for other
areas of the law including human rights, civil rights, consumer protection, and employment
protections, among others.
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environmental programs is often, though not always, the EPA, I use
the “EPA” throughout this Article as a shorthand for a primary federal
agency with an expressly environmental mission.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I
introduces an analytical framework that identifies five types of
horcrux. It also answers the basic questions about who can employ
them and at what stage in a regulatory program’s lifecycle they can be
employed. It offers examples of horizontal horcruxes, vertical
horcruxes, and private horcruxes: regulatory programs in which a
secondary federal agency, the states, or private actors, respectively,
play a role. These types are not necessarily exclusive, as hybrid forms
exist. Part II then asks the basic normative question—why create a
horcrux? What policy goals does it potentially serve and disserve?
These instruments can potentially increase the durability of regulatory
programs against the threat of successor exit through dispersal of
regulatory authority. Horcruxes may likewise improve the chance of a
program’s durability through increased democratic deliberation. By
requiring those initiating regulatory programs to engage with multiple
audiences and justify their programs in terms of broader values than
mere “environmental” protection, they are more likely to be defended
in the future by different, crosscutting constituencies and interest
groups. Yet horcruxes have disadvantages as well, even for those who
might benefit from their deployment. They may increase the costs of
creating a program, and the decentralization may weaken the
regulatory program. Combining these insights yields the Article’s
hypothesis that policies that are fragmented across institutions far
enough from the center to harden them against deregulatory pressure
may be imperfectly embedded or may be weaker at achieving
regulatory goals than direct, centralized regulation. Part III raises key
empirical questions, and concludes by offering an agenda for further
research.
A few takeaways are worth noting here. First, the Article’s
primary analytical contribution to the literature on strategic regulatory
design is viewing these horcruxes as a single phenomenon. This
generates a comparative hypothesis that a greater degree of
fragmentation away from centralization in a single federal agency
better insulates horcruxes from deregulatory pressure directed at the
center. However, fragmentation can simultaneously weaken
institutional power to achieve regulatory goals. Horizontal horcruxes
that involve co-regulation by federal agencies are the most centralized
form, and likely retain the most regulatory power. For example, these
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may best address problems of nationwide scope or interstate spillovers.
Yet horizontal horcruxes are simultaneously likely to be the weakest
at resisting deregulatory pressure. Private horcruxes may fare best at
resisting deregulatory pressure because private actors are not
answerable to the same public constituencies as federal agencies. Yet
private horcruxes may have less power to address national problems.
And private enforcement may be stymied by standing limitations in the
courts. The middle option, vertical horcruxes, in which the states or
local governments play a role in a regulatory program, may strike the
best balance between the degree of insulation and retention of power.
Second, although the horcrux analogy is a useful heuristic, it is
imperfect. For example, unlike the inanimate external objects used by
Lord Voldemort as mere receptacles for portions of his soul, the
relevant secondary institutions for regulatory horcruxes—federal
agencies, the states, and private actors—are not inanimate objects.22
They are institutions with their own leaders and stakeholders. Thus,
action by the initiating federal regulator may create the necessary
conditions for a horcrux, but with respect to both vertical and private
horcruxes, mere action by the center may not be sufficient. Creating a
horcrux in the regulatory context is a two-step process that requires not
only action by the federal government, but also further action by the
states or private actors to fully animate the horcrux.
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR HORCRUXES
This Part systematically explores the central descriptive
characteristics of horcruxes, including what a horcrux is, the five
primary types of horcrux, who can create each kind of horcrux, and
when such horcruxes can be created.
A. What Is a Regulatory Horcrux?
The term “horcrux,” familiar to any reader of the Harry Potter
series, refers to the external objects into which the villain Lord
Voldemort placed portions of his soul in an effort to achieve
immortality.23 Splitting one’s soul into horcruxes operates as a means
of self-preservation from attack: “Even if one’s body is attacked or
destroyed, one cannot die, for part of the soul remains earthbound and

22. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
23. ROWLING, supra note 1, at 497.
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undamaged.”24 The concept of a horcrux is thus consistent with the
notion that decentralization or fragmentation can be protective against
threats to a centrally organized system. The separation of powers
among the executive, legislature, and judiciary ensures that there are
centers of power outside any one branch of the federal government.
Our federal constitutional structure also guarantees that too much
power is not concentrated in the hands of the federal government visà-vis the states, but rather is fragmented across different regulators.
Decentralization or fragmentation can be technological as well as
political. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has
invested extensively in the creation of microgrids, which are local
sources of distributed energy generation, to insulate its operations
from disruption if the electric power grid is attacked.25 And though it
would be impossible to conclude that everyone who helped to create
the internet shared a single rationale for its decentralized structure, one
argument for its lack of a single, central hub was that it could “surviv[e]
a nuclear attack.”26 Other, more mundane examples of “fragmentation
as insulation” abound, from the method the fast-food chain KFC uses
to protect its secret recipe by dividing the recipe’s production among
different suppliers, each of whom knows only a portion of the
ingredients,27 to the basic principle of diversifying one’s investment
portfolio to reduce risk. Insulation through fragmentation is not
uniformly beneficial, however, depending upon one’s perspective. For
example, the rise of decentralized networks of terrorist cells has made
it more difficult for the United States to combat such organizations as
compared to more conventional national forces, and has increased
their unpredictability, anonymity, and effectiveness.28 The value of
fragmentation also runs up against concerns about power. The two are
likely to exist in an inverse relationship. Returning to the horcrux
analogy, Lord Voldemort’s humanity was diminished when his soul

24. Id.
25. SCOTT B. VAN BROEKHOVEN, NICHOLAS JUDSON, S. V. T. NGUYEN & WILLIAM ROSS,
MICROGRID STUDY: ENERGY SECURITY FOR DOD INSTALLATIONS 1 (2012), https://www.serdpestcp.org/News-and-Events/News-Announcements/Program-News/Microgrid-Study-EnergySecurity-for-DoD-Installations [https://perma.cc/NQ88-Y6MP].
26. WALTER ISAACSON, THE INNOVATORS 250–51 (2014) (quoting Vint Cerf, one of the
creators of ARPANET).
27. Corporate Espionage: Secrets and Lies, BRAND STRATEGY, Oct. 9, 2006, at 25.
28. Nicholas B. Pace, Decentralization: The Future of ISIS, SMALL WARS J. (Nov. 5, 2014),
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/decentralization-the-future-of-isis [https://perma.cc/9YYBMZM4].
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was fragmented into pieces.29 And ultimately, both the horcruxes and
Lord Voldemort were destroyed. Fragmentation’s benefits for
insulation from attack may come at the expense of the power that
derives from centralization.
By viewing this constellation of strategies together, this Article
builds on prior scholarship discussing how regulatory programs can
exist in shared regulatory space across multiple federal agencies or be
embedded in an agency other than the natural primary regulatory
agency;30 that regulatory power can be distributed between a federal
agency and state governments or within the states alone;31 or that
regulatory power can be distributed through public-private
partnerships, “new governance,” “modular environmental regulation,”
and other types of flexible, multipolar governance schemes with
private participants.32 Scholars in each of these areas have recognized
the possibility of regulatory or governance initiatives in which federal,
state, local, and/or private actors play roles and examined the many
values that such structures promote.33 Focusing in-depth on shared
29. See Horcrux, HARRY POTTER WIKI, http://harrypotter.wikia.com/wiki/Horcrux
[https://perma.cc/6S75-THFD] (“Creating multiple Horcruxes rendered the soul unstable and
liable to break apart if the creator of the Horcruxes was killed. For instance, Dumbledore
explicitly stated that Voldemort’s soul had become so unstable that it simply ‘broke apart’ when
Voldemort tried to murder Harry Potter . . . .”).
30. See, e.g., Aagaard, supra note 18, at 1239; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 18, at 1131
(focusing on coordination challenges of shared regulatory space and advocating presidential
control); Sarah E. Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, 55 B.C. L. REV. 879, 881, 885
(2014) (discussing the DoD’s role in promoting climate resilience to protect national security,
rather than environmental, interests); Spence, supra note 6, at 416 (noting that distribution of
power between federal agencies, or between the agency and a principal like Congress through a
more limited delegation, may affect policy outcomes).
31. Discussions of the values promoted by federalism, decentralization, and cooperative
federalism, and examples of such programs are too numerous to cite. For several in-depth
discussions, see generally William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and
the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1555–56 (2007); Michael C. Dorf & Charles
F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314 (1998);
Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); Sarah E.
Light, Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY L.J. 333 (2017); Richard
L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
32. See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE
L.J. 795, 798–803 (2005) (proposing dynamic, flexible, and adaptive arrangements for
environmental governance in contrast to traditional environmental law); Orly Lobel, The Renew
Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89
MINN. L. REV. 342, 344–47 (2004) (discussing the shift from a top-down regulation model to a
multipolar governance model).
33. Anne Joseph O’Connell has explored the related, though distinct, phenomenon of
bureaucratic institutions at the boundary of the federal administrative state, in which the
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regulatory space across multiple federal agencies , between the federal
government and the states, or through public-private hybrid
governance generates valuable insights in each specific context.
Examining regulatory horcruxes as a single phenomenon reveals a
bigger picture story about how comparative methods of strategic
institutional design can make successor exit more challenging in a
deregulatory environment, while retaining power to achieve regulatory
goals.
B. Institution and Degree of Overlap
There are three sets of institutions that can either share regulatory
authority with or replace the primary federal agency responsible for
environmental or natural resources protection. The first set of
institutions comprises federal agencies whose primary mission is
something other than environmental protection, such as the DoD or
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), among others.
Because these agencies do not have environmental protection as their
primary mission, I refer to them here as “secondary” agencies.
Regulatory programs can exist either entirely in such a secondary
federal agency or can be shared between a secondary agency and the
primary agency. Such splitting or sharing of regulatory programs at the
federal level generates horizontal horcruxes. The second set of
institutions comprises government agencies at the subfederal level,
including state and local governments.34 Splitting or sharing of
regulatory programs between the primary agency and subfederal
institutions creates vertical horcruxes. Finally, it is possible for private
institutions, including NGOs, private corporations or other firms, and
industry groups, among others, to share regulatory space with federal

institutions themselves incorporate aspects of international, state, or private participation, such
as in the cases of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, the National Guard, the World
Bank, and the U.S. Postal Service. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 841, 846 (2014).
34. Recent scholarship on “regionalism” has argued that decentralized federal actors can
generate policy variation and are worthy of examination in the federalism literature. See generally
Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Reviving Federal Regions, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(draft on file with the Duke Law Journal); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U. PA.
L. REV. 377 (2017); David Fontana, Federal Decentralization, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(draft on file with the Duke Law Journal); David Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63
UCLA L. REV. 58 (2016). However, because these actors remain federal actors within the
hierarchy of a single federal agency, they do not fit in the discussion of vertical horcruxes. To the
extent that regionalism exists within the context of a horizontal horcrux, the analysis of horizontal
horcruxes may apply.
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agencies. This final set of institutions generates private horcruxes.
The second feature that differentiates the various types of horcrux
is the degree of overlap or split in power between the primary and the
secondary institution. At one end of this continuum lie those programs
that involve overlapping jurisdiction between the primary federal
agency and the secondary institution or institutions. These are shared
horcruxes. At the other end of the spectrum are those that exist entirely
within the secondary institution, without any continuing oversight or
participation by the primary federal agency. These are external
horcruxes. Different degrees of sharing and continuing participation by
the primary federal agency exist along a continuum, so this binary
analysis necessarily involves some oversimplification.35
C. The Two-Step Creation Process
Of course, the horcrux analogy, although useful, is imperfect. To
create a horcrux, Lord Voldemort had to commit murder.36 The
creation process for regulatory horcruxes is somewhat less bloody, but
one step more complex. Unlike most of the horcruxes into which Lord
Voldemort split his soul—a diary, a ring, a locket, a cup, and a
diadem37—the secondary institutions examined here are not inanimate
objects. They are institutions with both independent leadership and
either public or private constituencies and stakeholders. Therefore, the
creation of a regulatory horcrux has both a necessary condition and a
sufficient condition. The necessary condition is some action on the part
of the federal government to place either some or all of a regulatory
program into a secondary institution. Action in this sense extends to
action that consciously does not preclude the secondary institution
from acting on its own, for example, a conscious decision by Congress

35. Alejandro Camacho and Robert Glicksman have argued that efforts at agency design
and redesign have often failed to appreciate three different dimensions of centralization, overlap,
and coordination, each of which affects how well programs fare against the normative values of
effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and legitimacy. Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman,
Functional Government in 3-D: A Framework for Evaluating Allocations of Government
Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 19, 21–23 (2014). Here, I focus on centralization and overlap
measured against the value of durability, but do not address the efforts at coordination that have
been the subject of extensive discussions elsewhere.
36. See ROWLING, supra note 1.
37. See Horcrux, supra note 29 (listing the different horcruxes that Lord Voldemort created).
It is worth noting that one horcrux was embedded into a living snake, and that there is some
debate over whether Harry himself became a horcrux when Lord Voldemort killed his parents.
Id. However, the majority were inanimate objects.
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or an agency not to preempt state action.38 Perfection of a horcrux
requires additional action on the part of the secondary institution to
accept it.
In the case of horizontal horcruxes, these two steps merge into
one: Congress can simply assign shared authority over a regulatory
program to both the primary agency and a secondary agency, or assign
all of the regulatory program to a secondary agency. However, these
two steps are discrete in the case of both vertical and private horcruxes.
Congress can create a regulatory program in which the federal
government and the states share regulatory authority. Or Congress can
create a program that does not preempt the states from acting on their
own. Likewise, Congress can create a program in which the federal
government and a private actor share regulatory responsibility. In the
second step, the state or private actor must accept responsbility to
enforce or implement the horcrux.
Only when both of these steps occur do external horizontal and
vertical horcruxes fit into the horcrux model. The center, however
defined, must intentionally vest these alternative regulators with
regulatory power and must retain the power to destroy the horcrux.
This two-step process thus reveals that purely private environmental
governance39 does not fit into the horcrux framework. Mere federal
government inaction in a particular sphere is not sufficient to meet the
horcrux creation threshold. Private environmental governance can
arise if Congress simply chooses not to regulate in a particular area, or
when an agency likewise chooses not to exercise its authority to
regulate. Yet the federal government cannot preempt private actors
from undertaking private governance that goes beyond federal
standards. Because the federal government does not need to act
intentionally to create private environmental governance, and cannot

38. Cf. generally Sarah E. Light, Advisory Nonpreemption, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 327 (2017)
(discussing how a federal agency can choose not to exercise preemptive power granted to it by
Congress to permit state experimentation).
39. See, e.g., Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental
Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 9–12 (2015) [hereinafter Light & Orts, Parallels
in Public and Private Environmental Governance] (examining the parallel tools that private and
public environmental governance employ); Sarah E. Light, The New Insider Trading:
Environmental Markets Within the Firm, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 5–6 (2015) (discussing private
carbon fees and emissions trading schemes as forms of private environmental governance with
global implications); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 129, 133–34 (2013) (identifying private environmental governance as occupying a
significant role in environmental standard-setting and enforcement in light of gaps in positive
environmental law).
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destroy private environmental governance through preemption, it does
not fit the horcrux framework.40
Combining these three sets of institutions with the different
degrees of overlap yields the following 3 x 2 matrix:
Table 1: A Matrix of Horcruxes

Shared

Concurrent
jurisdiction
between the
primary
federal agency
and the
secondary
federal agency

Institutional Actor
Vertical
Private Horcrux
Horcrux
Concurrent
jurisdiction
between the
federal
government
and the
states/local
government
Cooperative
federalism

Public-Private
Partnerships
Collaborative
Governance
Reflexive Law
Management-based
regulation
Private Citizen Suits

External

Degree of Overlapping Authority

Horizontal
Horcrux

Program exists
entirely in a
secondary
federal agency
or agencies

State or local
control over a
regulatory
program
without federal
agency
involvement

Not a Horcrux
Private
Environmental
Governance

40. That being said, as I and others have argued elsewhere, private environmental
governance is an important regulatory phenomenon in its own right. See supra note 39. In
addition, law is certainly necessary to create the space for private organizations and civil society
to function and adopt private environmental governance. Light & Orts, Parallels in Public and
Private Environmental Governance, supra note 39, at 11–12 & nn.36–38 (citing ERIC W. ORTS,
BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 1–108 (rev. ed. 2015)); Sarah E. Light, The
Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (draft on
file with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that corporate law, antitrust law, securities regulation,
and bankruptcy law, collectively affect private firms’ incentives to engage in private
environmental governance).
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These categories are not necessarily exclusive. It is possible that a
program may be shared between two federal agencies and incorporate
state participation as well.
The next sections offer more specific examples of the different
types of horcrux to fill out the contours in greater depth. It is worth
noting that these examples were not necessarily created with a horcrux
framework in mind. This framework is intended to be both analytical
and descriptive, but it is not a positive account of why existing
regulatory programs look the way they do.
D. Horcrux Examples
1. Horizontal Horcruxes. Federal agencies are simultaneously
tasked with achieving multiple goals, including potentially conflicting
goals, in a phenomenon that Eric Biber has dubbed the challenge of
“multiple-goal agencies.”41 Rather than considering how a single
agency prioritizes conflicting goals, the horcrux framework focuses on
the goal itself, and the impact that fragmenting a program across
multiple agencies or placing it entirely into an agency with a different
core mission has on achieving that goal over time. Thus, horcruxes
represent a shift from a framework of multiple-goal agencies to
multiple-agency goals or alternative-agency goals. Horizontal
horcruxes are likely to be the strongest of the three types at
maintaining the scope of a program, including addressing interstate
spillovers or other problems of national scope. Yet they are likely the
weakest of the three types at resisting deregulatory pressure at the
federal level. In the environmental context, if the EPA is in the
crosshairs of a deregulatory push by the president and Congress, other
agencies may face a similar deregulatory push by those same principals.
However, the need to frame a problem differently to generate a
horizontal horcrux, in terms that are consistent with the mission of the
secondary agency, may provide some insulation from this pressure, as
different constituencies may continue to support the program for
different reasons.
Some federal regulatory programs are shared between the
primary federal agency and secondary agencies. These shared
horizontal horcruxes take a variety of forms.42 Well-known examples
41. Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal
Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2009).
42. See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 18 (offering different mechanisms for
coordinating shared regulatory space including interagency consultation, interagency agreements,
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in the environmental context include the shared authority under the
Clean Water Act permitting program, pursuant to which the EPA and
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers jointly define the “waters of the
United States” for federal permitting requirements under Sections 402
and 404 of the Act.43 The EPA and the DOE share responsibility for
administering the Energy Star program, a government-sponsored
certification program for energy-efficient appliances and other
products which has, since the program’s creation in 1992, reduced
greenhouse gas emissions by 2.7 billion metric tons.44 Other shared
horizontal horcruxes include regulatory programs addressing lead
paint in residential housing, in which both the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) and the EPA play a role.45
External horizontal horcruxes include programs housed entirely
in a secondary federal agency or agencies whose mission does not
expressly include environmental protection. Many of the programs
that are part of “the military-environmental complex”46 fit into this
category. Although the DoD’s mission is to protect the national
security interest of the United States, not the environment, it is also the
largest consumer of energy in the nation, the federal agency that would
respond to geo-political instability resulting from extreme weather
events, a landowner that manages military installations facing the
threat of rising seas, and a warfighter that must equip its personnel with
energy resources in remote operational locations.47 Congress has
therefore tasked the DoD with reducing fossil fuel energy use and
developing new sources of renewable energy for electric power
generation to promote national security. Congress created an external
horizontal horcrux when it directed the DoD, alone among federal
joint policymaking, and joint rulemaking).
43. Clean Water Act §§ 402, 404, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344 (2012). There is also a vertical
horcrux in these provisions. See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 6294a (2012); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY STAR OVERVIEW OF
2015 ACHIEVEMENTS (2015), https://www.energystar.gov/sites/default/files/asset/document/
ES_OverviewAchievements_040816-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6ZT-H45E]. See generally
Energy Star, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.energystar.gov [https://perma.cc/DV4BHH8S]. This figure is equivalent to taking 578 million cars off the road for one year. Greenhouse
Gas
Equivalencies
Calculator,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY
(Sept.
2017),
https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-calculator [https://perma.cc/E2DAQ76A].
45. Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 § 1018, 42 U.S.C. § 4852d
(2012) (directing HUD and EPA to require the disclosure of known lead-based paint hazards
before the sale or lease of housing built prior to 1978).
46. Light, supra note 30, at 884.
47. Id. at 881, 885, 892, 893–94, 899 & n.100.
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agencies, “to produce or procure not less than 25 percent of the total
quantity of facility energy it consumes within its facilities during fiscal
year 2025 and each fiscal year thereafter from renewable energy
sources.”48 Given the significant impact of electricity generation on
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, increasing the share of
renewables in the grid can have a net positive impact on the
environment, and DoD actions can have positive spillover effects in the
private sector.49 Notwithstanding the many deregulatory efforts
targeting the climate and environmental programs housed in primary
federal agencies with environmental missions like the EPA and the
DOI, Congress nonetheless passed the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, which expresses Congress’s
position that “climate change is a direct threat to the national security
of the United States,” and directs the DoD to “ensure that it is
prepared to conduct operations both today and in the future and that
it is prepared to address the effects of a changing climate on threat
assessments, resources, and readiness.”50
Other external horizontal horcruxes include environmental
disclosure rules adopted and enforced by the SEC, whose mission is to
protect investors, to maintain fair markets, and facilitate the formation
of capital.51 Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC requires publicly traded firms to
disclose information that is “material” to investors.52 Significant
environmental matters, such as material risks to a firm’s business
arising out of domestic or international regulations or litigation, must
be disclosed in quarterly and annual reports to investors.53 In 2010, the
SEC issued guidance to public companies making clear that these
existing rules require disclosure of climate-related risks, including

48. 10 U.S.C. § 2911(e) (2012); Light, supra note 30, at 908.
49. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
SINKS ES-24 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-02/documents/2017_
complete_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LGU7-YZ3D].
50. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 335(b),
131 Stat. 1283, 1358 (2017).
51. What We Do, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/Article/
whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/E3SJ-763F].
52. Standard Instructions for Filing Forms Under Securities Act of 1933, Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975—Regulation S-K 17
C.F.R. §§ 229.10–229.702 (2012).
53. See generally Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999) (discussing the history of
environmental and social disclosures under SEC rules).
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those arising from existing or potential climate litigation or regulations
and those relating to the physical effects of climate change.54 This
information disclosure regime is analogous to various environmental
disclosure regimes managed by the EPA,55 but is housed entirely within
a secondary federal agency.
2. Vertical Horcruxes. The allocation of authority between the
federal government and subfederal governments can take a variety of
forms, only some of which allow the states or local governments to act
as co-regulators with the federal government, or solo regulators
pursuing continued regulatory action in the face of federal
retrenchment or deregulation. Although the federal government can
expressly create a shared vertical horcrux with co-regulatory authority
in the states, the federal government can only take the first step to
enable the necessary conditions for an external vertical horcrux. In that
case, the state or local government must accept the invitation. The
federal government maintains a “trump card” under the Supremacy
Clause to preempt state or local rules that are not identical to a federal
standard.56 This preemption can occur expressly in statutory language,
as in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, which
expressly prohibits state pesticide labeling rules.57 In other cases, even
in the absence of express language, courts have concluded that
Congress has impliedly preempted the entire “field,” because federal
regulation is so pervasive that there is no room for state or local
governance, or because there is a conflict between state and federal
law.58 Thus, whether vertical horcruxes can exist in either form is a

54. SEC Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change (Final
Rule), 75 Fed. Reg. 6289, 6290–97 (Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, and 241).
55. Sarah E. Light, NEPA’s Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on
Agencies, 87 TUL. L. REV. 511, 513 (2013) (discussing various environmental information
disclosure regimes).
56. Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 118 (2014)
(noting that Congress holds a “supremacy trump card”); see also Buzbee, supra note 31, at 1590–
92 (discussing ceiling preemption, which he calls “[u]nitary [f]ederal [c]hoice”). But see Jessica
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1265, 1276–
78 (2009) (arguing that states are sometimes “uncooperative” in federal schemes where the
federal government maintains preemptive power, limiting the federal government’s ability to play
its “trump card”).
57. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2012).
58. See Buzbee, supra note 31, at 1560–76 (discussing different forms of preemption under
federal law); Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION
CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 119 (William
Buzbee ed., 2009) (discussing the Supreme Court’s preemption doctrine).
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question of strategic regulatory design at the federal level. Shared
vertical horcruxes are likely to be as powerful as horizontal horcruxes
at achieving national goals or addressing interstate spillovers that the
states alone could not address because in each case the federal
government retains a role in the program.59 External vertical horcruxes
are likely to be weaker in this regard, however, as one state may be
unable to address pollution arising from another state. With respect to
deregulatory pressure, what can be created can likewise be taken away;
thus, vertical horcruxes remain within the zone of deregulatory
danger.60 However, by creating a new constituency within a state or
states that participate in the implementation and enforcement of a
regulatory program, this deregulatory power may become more
difficult to exercise over time.61
In the absence of preemption or any other constitutional limits on
state action such as under the Dormant Commerce Clause,62 however,
states and local governments can be co-regulators with a primary
federal agency or solo regulators in different forms of vertical
horcruxes. A decision by the federal government to create a
cooperative federalism regime generates shared vertical horcruxes.
Examples include state enforcement of federal regulatory standards
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).63 A
second example under the Clean Water Act is the structure of the

59. See generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996) (proposing ways to address interstate pollution externalities more
effectively than the EPA and courts were doing at the time).
60. Indeed, states’ rights are often cited as a rationale for deregulation though there is always
the risk that this may include only states’ rights to pollute, not states’ rights to promote greater
environmental protection. Richard Revesz, Opinion, According to Scott Pruitt, States Only Have
the Right to Pollute, Not Protect Their Environments, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017, 4:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-revesz-pruitt-epa-federalism-20170320-story.html
[https://perma.cc/V8P4-B4GZ].
61. See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 39, 43–44 (1980) (discussing the “endowment effect,” which is the theory that people
ascribe greater value to what they already own, as the “underweighting of opportunity costs”).
62. See Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005) (noting
that the Dormant Commerce Clause precludes the states from “plac[ing] burdens on the flow of
commerce across its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would not bear” (quoting
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995)) (alteration in original)).
63. States have lead responsibility for implementing federal regulatory requirements, and
must submit their programs to the EPA for a so-called “determination of adequacy.” Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act § 4005, 42 U.S.C. § 6945(c)(1)(C) (2012). The EPA can authorize
states to implement their own approved state programs instead of the federal program. § 3006, 42
U.S.C. § 6926 (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 271.1 (2017).
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Section 402/404 permit program.64 Whereas the EPA and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers share responsibility for ensuring that no
discharge of a pollutant into waters of the United States occurs without
a federal permit, the Act incorporates a significant shared vertical
horcrux. Under Section 401, one seeking a permit to discharge into the
navigable waters of the United States must further seek approval from
the relevant state, which has authority to set water quality standards.65
State approval is required even if the entity requesting the permit is a
federal agency. Thus, in the face of federal retrenchment or any easing
in the granting of permits, the states serve as an important potential
regulatory backstop.
When a state is afforded special authority under a federal statute
to adopt its own regulatory standards, subject to EPA approval, this
creates a vertical horcrux. For example, although the Clean Air Act
generally preempts any state or political subdivision from adopting or
attempting to enforce “any standard relating to the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,”66
there is an external vertical horcrux embedded within this regulatory
program. California is exempt from preemption if it can demonstrate
that its emissions standards are “at least as protective of public health
and welfare as” the federal standards, and obtains a waiver from the
EPA.67 The California waiver has been crucial in the iterative
development of motor vehicle emissions standards over time, and now
arguably serves as one of the most important backstops against federal
efforts to reduce the stringency of vehicle emissions and fuel economy
standards.68
The federal government can also create external vertical
64. Clean Water Act §§ 402, 404, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344 (2012).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1341; see also PUD No.1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 511
U.S. 700, 711 (1994); cf. Spence, supra note 6, at 426 (noting that Section 401 was adopted to
“creat[e] more proenvironment decision outcomes in the hydro licensing program” managed by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission(FERC)).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012).
67. Id. § 7543(b). Other states may then adopt California’s standards. Id. § 7507. Ironically,
McNollgast’s discussion of the federalism issues within the Clean Air Act is a story of increasing
“federalization” in the federal government. McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 6, at
446–49. This Article finds the more interesting issue to arise from the authority that was left
behind in the states.
68. See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097,
1099–1100 (2009); Jacques Leslie, In the Face of a Trump Environmental Rollback, California
Stands in Defiance, YALEENVIRONMENT360 (Feb. 21, 2017), http://e360.yale.edu/features/in-theface-of-trump-environmental-rollback-california-stands-in-defiance
[https://perma.cc/PW7WPZEU].
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horcruxes when the federal government regulates in an area but
specifically exempts a particular practice from federal rules. State
governance of oil and gas leases or hydraulic fracturing is a prime
example.69 For example, the Safe Drinking Water Act requires the
EPA to set minimum requirements for effective state underground
injection permit programs to prevent endangerment of drinking
water.70 However, the underground injection of hydraulic fracturing
“fluids or propping agents” is specifically exempt from this
requirement, leaving regulation in this area up to the states.71
Efforts by the states to address climate change from stationary
sources, such as California’s AB-32 cap-and-trade program,72 likewise
exemplify external vertical horcruxes. The Clean Air Act’s preemption
provisions only apply to motor vehicle emissions; thus Congress
expressly allowed the states to exceed federal standards from
stationary sources of air emissions. This federal choice to allow the
states to exceed federal standards permits the states to step in. A
particularly compelling recent example of the importance of this
external vertical horcrux arises out of the Trump administration’s
statement that the United States intends to withdraw73 from the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change (the Paris Agreement).74 On June 5,
2017, several days after the president notified the international
community of his intent to withdraw from the Agreement, the “We
Are Still In” Declaration (the Declaration) was released.75 The
69. See David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy
Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 506–08 (2013) (arguing that the states can continue to take a
leading role in regulating hydraulic fracturing).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1).
71. Id. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii).
72. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 38500–38599 (2006).
73. See Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y.
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climateagreement.html [https://perma.cc/VGV8-H3VD]. Under the terms of the Agreement, withdrawal
cannot formally take place until November 4, 2020, one year after a party gives notice of
withdrawal, which cannot occur until three years after the agreement entered into force. Brad
Plumer, The U.S. Won’t Actually Leave the Paris Climate Deal Anytime Soon, N.Y. TIMES (June
7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/climate/trump-paris-climate-timeline.html [https://
perma.cc/ZWU7-LVLN].
74. Conference of the Parties Dec. 1/CP.21 (Dec. 12, 2015), in Report of the Conference of
the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015,
Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Twenty-First Session,
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
75. “WE ARE STILL IN” DECLARATION, https://www.wearestillin.com/we-are-stilldeclaration [https://perma.cc/D8SB-Y52T].
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Declaration states: “We, the undersigned mayors, county executives,
governors, tribal leaders, college and university leaders, businesses,
and investors are joining forces for the first time to declare that we will
continue to support climate action to meet the Paris Agreement.”76 The
Declaration acknowledges that “it is local, tribal, and state
governments, along with businesses, that are primarily responsible for
the dramatic decrease in greenhouse gas emissions in recent years.
Actions by each group will multiply and accelerate in the years ahead,
no matter what policies Washington may adopt.”77 As of January 2018,
more than 2,500 cities, states, private firms, and universities have
signed the Declaration.78 In addition, the governors of California, New
York, and Washington State created the U.S. Climate Alliance to
ensure “coordinated state action” to meet the goals of the Paris
Agreement, which now counts among its members fourteen states and
Puerto Rico.79 At the local level, 389 Mayors “representing 69 million
Americans” have signed on as Climate Mayors and remain committed
to meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement.80 America’s Pledge is an
additional effort led by Governor Jerry Brown and former Mayor of
New York Michael Bloomberg “to compile and quantify the actions of
states, cities and businesses” to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions.81 These vertical horcruxes have potential to keep the United
States moving in the right direction toward the goals set by the United
States under the Paris Agreement, even in the face of exit by the
federal government. This was not merely a random, fortuitous event,
but depended upon strategic institutional design in the Clean Air Act
and the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement expressly
contemplated a role for subnational action to contribute to meeting the
Agreement’s goals.82 And had Congress expressly preempted all state

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. UNITED STATES CLIMATE ALLIANCE: STATES UNITED FOR CLIMATE ACTION,
https://www.usclimatealliance.org [https://perma.cc/9DTK-5L6H].
80. CITIES ADOPT THE PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT GOALS, http://climatemayors.org
[https://perma.cc/2962-JB22].
81. AMERICA’S PLEDGE, https://www.bloomberg.org/program/environment/americaspledge [https://perma.cc/K5NX-2FKL].
82. See Paris Agreement, supra note 74, § V (Non-Party stakeholders); id. para. 117
(welcoming “the efforts of non-Party stakeholders to scale up their climate actions” and
encouraging those actions to be registered “in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action
platform”); id. para. 133 (welcoming “the efforts of all non-Party stakeholders to address and
respond to climate change, including those of civil society, the private sector, financial institutions,
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and local action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions arising from
stationary sources under the Clean Air Act, such actions would not be
possible in the face of deregulatory pressure at the federal level.
3. Private Horcruxes. The final type of horcrux, which exists only
in a shared form, involves private institutions acting as co-regulators
with the federal government. There are many different private
horcruxes, all of which fall at different points along the continuum of
overlapping authority. As a result, they also have different degrees of
tradeoff between centralization and insulation from deregulatory
pressure. The private horcrux that retains the highest degree of both
centralization and power to achieve national regulatory priorities is
contained in the citizen-suit provisions that Congress adopted in almost
every major federal environmental statute.83 After giving notice of an
environmental violation to the violator, the relevant state, and the
EPA administrator, a private citizen or an environmental advocacy
organization may file suit to enforce federal environmental
regulations.84 These citizen-suit provisions encourage private actors to
bring such suits by providing for attorney’s fees.85 Unlike other federal
statutes that expand private remedies for private wrongs,86 these
citizen-suit provisions allow private actors to deter and enjoin public
wrongs as “private attorneys general”87 when there is a concern that
cities and other subnational authorities”); NAZCA: TRACKING CLIMATE ACTION,
http://climateaction.unfccc.int [https://perma.cc/9L9W-FGCY] (recording “the commitments to
climate action by companies, cities, subnational, regions, investors, and civil society
organizations”).
83. Citizen-suit provisions are found in the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)
(2012); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012); the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012); and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2012). I do not
include suits against an agency for failing to undertake a non-discretionary duty, which are also
contained in these provisions, as horcruxes. Citizen-suit provisions do exist outside the
environmental context, notably in the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3731 (2012). Judicially
created private rights of action exist in other regulatory contexts as well. See Richard B. Stewart
& Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1198 (1982)
(examining different judicially created private rights to address regulatory failures).
84. See supra note 83.
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f). More
citizen suits have been litigated under the Clean Water Act than any other statute. Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 204
(2000).
86. An example of this is Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012), which allows
for the awarding of treble damages and attorney fees.
87. Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 837 (1985).
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the federal or state governments are underenforcing public law.
However, private citizen suits are not necessarily as powerful as the
federal government itself enforcing these laws. To invoke the federal
courts’ jurisdiction, private citizens must demonstrate standing, and
they are generally, though not always, limited to seeking relief for
ongoing harm through injunctive relief, rather than damages for past
harms.88 To the extent that they are permitted by the statutes to seek
damages, such damages are paid to the federal treasury. Although
Congress adopted these citizen-suit provisions as part of the original
statutory schemes, it was only in the mid-1980s that private actors
began to use them in significant measure, precisely when the federal
EPA was in a deregulatory phase under the Reagan administration.89
Congress could certainly destroy these private horcruxes by amending
these statutes, but their power to address national problems remains
significant.
A second set of private horcruxes falls under the category of
reflexive law or management-based regulation, in which the federal
government encourages a private entity, often a firm, to adopt a private
environmental management system or otherwise to exceed mandatory
compliance levels.90 One example of this is the now-defunct Project
XL, in which the EPA would agree to approve a single, comprehensive
permit for a firm that made private commitments to improve its
environmental performance, thus streamlining the often complex
permitting process. Government agencies can also incorporate private
standards by reference, can endorse private standards, or can adopt
them as safe harbors or best practices.91 Alternatively, federal agencies
can contract with private entities to implement federal programs or
provide services pursuant to federal programs.92
88. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 50 (1987)
(holding that the Clean Water Act citizen-suit provision permits only suits for ongoing violations).
After Gwaltney, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to permit citizen suits for past violations.
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1).
89. Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 87, at 835.
90. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 696–700 (2003); Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 55–66 (1997); Eric W.
Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1271–72 (1995).
91. See generally Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. &
ADMIN. L. 291 (2014) (discussing multiple ways in which agencies can “harness” private
governance); David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 296 (2006) (discussing how
agencies adopt private “best practices” as regulatory standards).
92. See Freeman, supra note 90, at 55–66 (offering examples of collaboration between public
agencies and private contractors).
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E. Who Can Create Horcruxes?
The question of who can create a horcrux depends largely upon
the type. For horizontal horcruxes, Congress is likely to be the initiator
because there are limits on whether one agency can redelegate
authority over a regulatory program to a different agency. With respect
to vertical horcruxes, the authority is somewhat more dispersed. In an
authorizing statute, Congress may (a) choose to preempt state law
expressly, (b) create a comprehensive scheme that a court might find
to preempt the field as a matter of implication, (c) not preempt state
law, or (d) carve out a limited exception from preemption of state law
such as the California waiver provision under the Clean Air Act.93 But
federal agencies, too, have a role to play in preemption both when
Congress has expressly delegated authority to the agency to determine
whether state law is preempted, and when Congress has delegated
interpretive power to the agency, with preemptive consequences.94
Even when Congress delegates power to agencies to preempt or to
interpret statutory provisions that will have preemptive effect, the
agency need not always choose to exercise that authority—a form of
nonpreemption, which is often a matter of conscious choice.95 For
shared private horcruxes, Congress may create a program that involves
joint federal-private action, or an agency may choose to delegate
standard-setting authority to a private institution or choose to work
with a private actor in some form of collaborative governance.
F. When Can Horcruxes Be Created?
Unlike agency burrowing or self-insulation techniques, which are

93. See supra note 70.
94. See generally Light, supra note 38, at 327 (discussing nonpreemption of state regulatory
experimentation through agency interpretive power); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption
Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2008) (arguing for limiting agencies’
authority to preempt state law); Catherine Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 521 (2012) (discussing federal agencies’ role in preemption). But see Joshua Hawkes & Mark
Seidenfeld, A Positive Defense of Administrative Preemption, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 63, 64
(2014) (offering a more positive view of agency preemption). For example, in the 2016
amendments to the Toxic Substances Control Act, Congress authorized the EPA to grant waivers
from preemption of state law under certain circumstances. Sarah E. Light, Regulating Toxic
Chemicals Through Precautionary Federalism, 3 PENN UNDERGRADUATE L.J. 1, 12–13 (2016)
(discussing preemption and waiver provisions).
95. Light, supra note 38, at 328; cf. Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1228–29 (discussing different
“triggers” for federal preemption or nonpreemption of state action in the climate context, such as
a “formal finding or action by a designated government official” or committee of experts).
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best employed during the lame duck period,96 or the creation of a new
independent agency designed to be insulated from short-term interest
group pressure,97 there is some flexibility as to when a regulatory
horcrux can be created.
Undoubtedly, horcruxes can be created by the initiating regulator
at the program’s inception. But they can also be added later by a
sympathetic successor government.98 In addition, a successor agency
can create a vertical horcrux through its interpretive powers to choose
nonpreemption of state law.99 In some sense, private horcruxes are the
most flexible type. Agencies frequently delegate standard-setting
power to private standard-setting organizations and have the ability to
redelegate or withdraw that power over time.100 The key point is that
the creation and destruction of horcruxes is not limited to the initiating
regulator at the time a regulatory program is created. Just as
antiregulatory successors can take steps to move toward regulatory
exit, proregulatory successors have the ability to harden or insulate
existing regulatory programs through the use of horcruxes.
II. WHY HORCRUXES?
While Part I examines the basic characteristics of horcruxes, this
Part asks the normative question of why a regulator would employ
horcruxes at all. What policy objectives do they serve and what
challenges or harms might they present from the perspective of the
initiating regulator and successor administrations? The primary
normative concern animating this entire discussion is to ensure that a
regulatory program ends when it “should”—neither too early, nor too
late. The challenge of course, is that at any given moment, opposing
interest groups will likely perceive the current regulatory program to
96. Mendelson, supra note 12, at 565 n.34.
97. Barkow, supra note 13, at 17.
98. Cf. Spence, supra note 6, at 426 (discussing the adoption of Section 401 of the Clean
Water Act as a structural control designed to “creat[e] more proenvironment decision outcomes”
in the separate regulatory licensing program for hydropower managed by FERC).
99. See Light, supra note 38, at 328, 330 n.13 (noting that the agency’s interpretation of
whether the Motor Vehicle Safety Act preempted state law changed from a position of
preemption to one of nonpreemption).
100. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551–
56 (2000) (discussing private standard-setting as a common aspect of public law); Emily
Hammond, Double-Deference in Administrative Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1710 (2016)
(expressing concern that agencies give private standard-setting organizations deference, and then
courts reviewing agency action give deference to such standards, without sufficient oversight at
either level).

LIGHT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1674

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/21/2018 6:47 PM

[Vol. 67:1647

be overdue for exit and at the same time not yet fulfilling its regulatory
mission. This Part therefore acknowledges that one’s perspective
differs depending upon one’s relationship to the regulatory status
quo.101
A. Advantages
Horcruxes are precautionary.102 They are more likely to preserve
the status quo in the face of short-term opposition to a regulatory
program, because they increase both the number of hoops that must be
jumped through to exit a regulatory program and the number of
constituencies with different values who are likely to care about
continuing the program.103 Thus, they are a regulatory correlate of
William Eskridge’s “vetogates”—rules of proceedings adopted by the
House and Senate that “create multiple opportunities in each chamber
for opponents to kill proposed legislation.”104 Programs shared across
multiple federal agencies are often governed by multiple committees
within the House or Senate, each of which may have an interest in
continuing the program to maintain their control.105 Programs shared
between the federal government and the states likewise have the power
to generate multiple constituencies of support who may be reluctant to
give up the benefits of the program. Such constituencies include not
only regulators at the subfederal level, and public interest group
beneficiaries of the regulations, but private firms whose business

101. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 18, at 1135 n.4, 1138–39 (citing an extensive political
science literature on “redundancy,” concluding that “[i]t is hard to generalize about redundancy,
since sometimes it leads to beneficial outcomes and other times does not”) (citing JAMES Q.
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 274
(1989)).
102. Cf. Light, supra note 38, at 346–50, 360–65 (discussing how dynamic overlapping
jurisdiction is precautionary, and exploring the circumstances under which precaution is
desirable).
103. For a seminal discussion of the “costs of exit” in the political science literature, see Paul
Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
251, 252, 262 (2000) (arguing that political actors often design policies in ways that “make
preexisting arrangements hard to reverse” in anticipation of shifting political control).
104. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441, 1444–46 (2008) (arguing that House and Senate rules create multiple “vetogates”—
procedural points in the legislative process where bills can die—beyond the requirements of
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution).
105. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 18, at 1139, 1144 (“[M]embers will be reluctant to dispense
with delegation regimes that increase their ability to take credit and disperse blame or that help
them to manage principal-agent slack.”); Horn & Shepsle, supra note 6, at 504 (discussing
durability as a result of the congressional committee system).
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models depend upon stability in the regulatory environment.106
Programs shared between the federal government and private actors
often have benefits in efficiency and expertise, in which the regulated
community has a greater hand in shaping the regulations that govern
it, and thus, greater buy-in. Programs that exist solely within secondary
institutions likewise entrench their own constituencies of support.
Horcruxes have the potential to improve democratic deliberation.
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have argued that deliberative
democracy is the solution to the problem of making binding, collective
decisions despite “continuing moral conflict” in pluralistic societies.107
Such conflict undoubtedly exists in the context of environmental
regulation. Framing a problem as an environmental one may make a
program more of a deregulatory target than framing it as a matter of
national security, public health, or providing material information to
investors.108 Because more voices play a role in the legislative or
regulatory process, horizontal horcruxes may, like vetogates, increase
the number of “legislative compromises, logrolls, and bundles” in a
way that requires multiple voices to conclude that the program should
end and its goals have been met.109 Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph
O’Connell have recently argued that overlapping jurisdiction or
requirements of coordination across federal agencies can “foster fuller
development of information and debate, along with broader

106. William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 2017
WIS. L. REV. 1037, 1057, 1063 (arguing that overlapping jurisdiction creates constituencies of
support among private firms in markets created by regulations, and that such constituencies rely
on regulatory stability).
107. See Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy is Different, 17
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 161, 161 (2004) (noting that the fundamental principle of a deliberative theory
“is that citizens owe one another justifications for the laws they collectively impose on one
another”).
108. See generally Sarah E. Light, Valuing National Security: Climate Change, the Military, and
Society, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1772, 1780–93 (2014) (surveying literature demonstrating partisanship
and boomerang effects with respect to environmental framing of climate change as compared to
framing climate change as a public health issue or one of national security).
109. See Eskridge, supra note 104, at 1449, 1453–54:
If vetogates make statutes hard to enact, they make them doubly hard to repeal. To
repeal a statute, supporters must not only press their proposal through various
vetogates, but they must contend with a regulatory endowment effect: most statutes
create constituencies and reliance interests for their regulatory regime, and these
engender extra opposition to changing or abandoning the statutory policy.
(citing Thaler, supra note 61, at 43–44 (defining the “endowment effect”)); cf. Freeman & Rossi,
supra note 18, at 1142 (noting benefits of harnessing the “unique expertise and competencies of
different agencies”).
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representation for conflicting interests.”110 As with the vetogates
model, horcruxes operate in a more complex fashion than simply
making it harder to deregulate. It bears repeating that the challenge is
not simply to increase the length of time that a program exists in a
linear fashion at all costs. The challenge is rather to ensure that a
regulatory program ends when its goals have been met and continues
when its goals have not. By placing programs in the hands of multiple
institutions, often with different primary missions, horcruxes can
increase the likelihood that coalitions must form to change the
program.
When a single primary regulator like the EPA is the subject of
special, targeted deregulatory pressure, horcruxes have the potential
to increase the costs of short-term deregulatory pressure by providing
alternative institutions to enforce regulatory programs.111 Jody
Freeman and Jim Rossi have pointed out that when authority is
dispersed across multiple agencies, interest groups must divide their
lobbying efforts, which is costly.112 Dispersing authority also decreases
the risk of agency capture113 and can improve policymaking.114 William
Buzbee has argued that by lessening the impact of deregulation at the
centralized federal level of government, overlapping jurisdiction
between the federal government and the states can “hedge” against the
consequences of regulatory reversal or “implementation failure” for

110. Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 CALIF. L.
REV. 1375, 1384–87, 1407 (2017) (offering a taxonomy of different forms of interagency conflict,
observing that conflicts can also occur within agencies, describing mechanisms by which such
conflicts are resolved, and finding both benefits and costs in such conflicts).
111. Cf. Aagaard, supra note 18, at 1275:
Congress can mitigate the risk of EPA implementation failure, or indeed
implementation failure by any particular agency, by legislating across multiple fronts—
for example, multiple embedded environmental laws administered by different
agencies, or both canonical and embedded environmental laws—thereby improving the
likelihood that some policy to address the problem will be implemented. Delegating
environmental laws across a broader range of institutions could allow other agencies to
implement substitute policies when EPA is stymied.
(footnote omitted) (citing Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and
Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 292–94 (2011)). Although Aagaard’s account
focuses only on the embedding of environmental laws into other federal agencies, horcruxes can
be created not only in other federal agencies subject to the control of the new administration, but
also into the states and private hands, which are less subject to control by the president or
Congress.
112. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 18, at 1142–43.
113. Id. at 1185–86.
114. Id. at 1143; cf. Katyal, supra note 18, at 2317 (“When [federal agencies] have to convince
each other of why their view is right . . . better decision-making results.”).
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private firms that depend upon regulatory stability.115 Many of the
same arguments hold for private horcruxes as well, though the
institutions that must be lobbied differ.116
By limiting the ability of short-term coalitions or factions to
reflexively end regulatory programs, horcruxes have the potential to
foreground the long-term public interest.117 Other scholars have
written about the tradeoff between agency independence and
democracy in the context of independent, rather than executive,
agencies such as the Federal Reserve or the SEC, the heads of which
are removable by the president only for cause, thus giving these
agencies a measure of independence from political pressure that
executive agencies lack.118 This independence arguably allows agencies
to make decisions based on “expert information” rather than shortterm political pressure, especially for policies that may have short-term
costs but long-term benefits.119 Environmental policies distribute costs
and benefits across large time scales, making them a particular target
for short-term interest group pressure.120 Others focusing on the
phenomenon of “agency burrowing” before a presidential transition
have argued that agencies can “entrench” policies to offset the concern
that a new administration will be “overly responsive to a majoritarian
faction.”121 The same concern may arise over a nonmajoritarian faction.

115. Buzbee, supra note 106, at 1039.
116. There is a substantial literature on the impact of activist and interest group pressure
directly on firms, rather than public regulators or legislators through the political process. See
generally David P. Baron, Private Politics, 12 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 31 (2003) (discussing
activist boycotts targeting private firms as “private politics” and the resulting firm behavior as
“private regulation”); David P. Baron, Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and
Integrated Strategy, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 7 (2001) (same); David P. Baron & Daniel
Diermeier, Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 599,
600–01 (2007) (discussing firm responses to activism).
117. Cf. Barkow, supra note 13, at 19, 28–29 (arguing that agency independence prioritizes
long-term public welfare over short-term political pressure); O’Connell, supra note 12, at 528
(suggesting that the insulation of existing policies by outgoing presidents can be advantageous if
they have long-term goals in mind).
118. Barkow, supra note 13, at 24–29. See generally PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND
INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2016).
119. Barkow, supra note 13, at 33; Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1184–87 (identifying climate
change as a “super wicked” problem because it magnifies various human biases against addressing
long-term issues, and legislation to address it has long-term benefits and short-term costs).
120. Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1174–76; Light, supra note 31, at 348.
121. Mendelson, supra note 12, at 620.
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B. Disadvantages
Durability of the status quo, however, is not always a good thing,
at least not from the perspective of a successor administration which
arguably has a democratic mandate to advance its own regulatory
priorities.122 Although the list of disadvantages may be shorter than the
list of advantages, the primary concern is one that is deeply important
to our democratic system: if horcruxes in fact make it more difficult for
a successor administration to exit a regulatory program, horcruxes
have the potential to limit the democratic accountability of the
regulatory state, a problem that is central to administrative law.123
Given the fact that the federal agencies that implement and enforce
such regulatory programs are not themselves democratically
accountable institutions, but rather derive their legitimacy from their
status as agents of elected members of Congress and the president, any
further loss of political accountability would be significant.124
Horcruxes may limit the flexibility of a new administration to
respond to changing or changed circumstances.125 In the context of
constitutional
interpretation,
entrenchment
of
“original”
interpretations over the concept of a “living” constitution has been
referred to as creating the “dead hand” problem.126 Many scholars and
political philosophers have rejected the idea that one generation’s
understanding of the constitution should bind another, and that instead
an understanding of the constitution as a living document is needed.127

122. Cf. Bruce R. Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 102 GEO. L.J.
991, 995 (2014). Huber draws the important distinction between durability and longevity, arguing
that durability implies “resilience and robustness in the face of strain or pressure or opposition,”
while “[l]ongevity alone is generally not problematic.” Id. at 995, 995 n.14. In the horcrux context,
the key issue is how to preserve the right kind of durability, not longevity alone. For an argument
questioning the assumption that more political control necessarily produces “good or popular
policies,” see Spence, supra note 15, at 438–39.
123. See Mendelson, supra note 12, at 566–67.
124. See id. at 577–78.
125. Cf. O’Connell, supra note 12, at 528.
126. See Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CALIF. L. REV. 277,
357 (1985) (“The dead hand of the past ought not to govern, . . . and any theory of interpretation
that demands that it does is a bad theory.”); Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—
In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2009).
127. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
11 (1980) (“[T]o the extent that [the Constitution] ever represented the ‘voice of the
people’ . . . [it] represent[s] the voice of people who have been dead for a century or two.”); David
Hume, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 452, 457
(Oxford Univ. Press 1963) (1748) (rejecting the idea of “consent of the fathers to bind the
children”); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, in THE
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In the context of regulatory programs, an analogous argument could
be made. Many administrative law scholars have argued that
regulatory agencies are uniquely positioned to reinterpret the law to
address changed circumstances.128 Horcruxes could potentially limit
this flexibility. And though it may remain possible to overturn or
reverse existing regulatory programs that contain horcruxes, these
splits of regulatory authority could potentially increase the costs of
such reversals.129 Finally, even if there is no immediate effort to exit
such a regulatory program, regulatory overlap can be more costly at
the outset.130
Richard Lazarus has argued compellingly, however, that in the
climate change context in particular, precommitment strategies to
protect regulation from short-term reversals do not undermine
democratic accountability; rather such asymmetric efforts to harden
climate change law against deregulatory pressure enhance democratic
accountability.131 In his view, ensuring the durability of climate change
regulation or legislation is necessary to give future generations the
ability to engage in the democratic process at all.132 In a similar vein,
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 39, 111–12 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1997) (1762) (rejecting the idea that one generation can bind another through “perpetual
Government”); Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh Grewal, Make Me Democratic, But Not
Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalists, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1975, 2005 (2015)
(characterizing the countermajoritarian difficulty as an intertemporal problem); Lazarus, supra
note 10, at 1195–1200 (discussing debates over the “dead hand” problem and the value of
precommitment strategies in the climate context).
128. See generally David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 265 (2013) (arguing that “big waiver”—a congressional delegation to agencies of the
power to “unmake . . . statutory provisions”—is a powerful tool to update stale laws); Daniel T.
Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548 (2016) (discussing express delegations
of administrative forbearance as a tool to address changed circumstance); Jody Freeman & David
B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014) (stating that federal agencies
are well situated to update existing legislation to address new problems like climate change).
129. Cf. Mendelson, supra note 12, at 589–99 (increasing the procedures that must be utilized
to reverse a rule increases the costs of doing so); Nou, supra note 12, at 1814–15 (increasing the
scope of review in response to self-insulation increases the costs and resources required to review
and overturn the rule, which may make such reviews so expensive that an executive who would
otherwise overturn them decides not to do so).
130. See Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 184 (2011) (arguing
that “antiduplication institutions” are needed to avoid the problems associated with redundancy).
Freeman and Rossi reject the term “redundancy” as “misleading” because it “suggests literal
duplication, and instead favor the more nuanced concept of ‘shared regulatory space.’” Freeman
& Rossi, supra note 18, at 1135–36 (noting that the term “redundancy” comes from political
science literature).
131. Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1194–1205 (offering reasons why asymmetric precommitment
strategies in the climate context do not offend democratic values).
132. Id. at 1195; see also id. at 1154 (noting that the purpose of strategies to enhance the
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Cass Sunstein has likened the need for precautionary legal rules in the
climate context, in which climate change can lead to irreversible,
catastrophic harm, as similar to purchasing an “option” to prevent
harm at a later date.133 While these accounts focused on a different set
of tools, the argument likewise applies to horcruxes in this context.
A final concern is that there are weaknesses embedded within the
horcruxes themselves. As regulatory authority becomes more
dispersed or fragmented into secondary institutions away from the
primary agency, this may increasingly insulate a program from
deregulatory attack, yet the program may exist in a weakened state.
For example, fragmentation may lead to coordination failures. After
the September 11 attacks on the United States, the 9/11 Commission
concluded that fragmentation among the nation’s intelligence and
national security agencies led to failures of coordination that limited
the ability of government to act on relevant intelligence information.134
There are other ways in which a fragmented regulatory program may
be less able to accomplish what a program centralized in a single
primary regulator at the federal level could. Two examples illustrate
this challenge. First, of all of the types, private horcruxes are
unquestionably the most removed from federal deregulatory pressure,
as private actors do not face pressure from the same voter
constituencies. Yet private actors lack the same enforcement capacity
as government agencies. Notably, they must establish standing to
enforce citizen-suit provisions. The impacts of other kinds of publicprivate actions such as reflexive law or management-based regulation
may affect only a small number of firms, and thus may have a smaller
impact than centralized federal regulations. Second, vertical horcruxes
that allow states to adopt environmental regulatory programs have the
potential to be incredibly significant in the face of withering federal
action, especially with respect to climate change. Yet states cannot so
easily address interstate pollution spillovers from other states, a
primary rationale for uniform, federal rules.135 And in the case of the

durability of climate change legislation or regulations is “not to protect the present at the expense
of the future, but the precise opposite: to protect the future at the expense of the present”).
133. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 841 (2006).
134. Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2006) (noting the 9/11
Commission’s concerns about fragmentation, but arguing that “[u]nification can . . . have costs as
well: for example, destroying needed safeguards and eliminating beneficial agency or committee
competition,” and advocating a balance between redundancy and centralization).
135. See supra note 31.
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states, the federal government can always exercise its authority under
the Supremacy Clause to prohibit the states from acting at all.136 Thus,
policy fragmentation limits the concentration of power both for
positive and negative ends.
III. A RESEARCH AGENDA
Further empirical research is needed to understand whether
regulatory horcruxes actually withstand deregulatory pressures better
than programs housed within a primary federal agency like the EPA in
the environmental context, and which types are the most effective in
this regard. In addition, further empirical research is needed to
understand the impact of each type of horcrux on deliberative
democracy, including whether they encourage broader framing of what
could easily be understood as purely environmental programs.
On the question of durability, to be sure, there has been significant
political pushback against both vertical and horizontal horcruxes by
deregulatory forces. For example, at the horizontal level, there have
been efforts to block the SEC from enforcing its climate guidance,
though the regulations and guidance currently remain in effect.137 On
February 28, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order calling
on the EPA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to review the existing
regulatory definition in the “Clean Water Rule” that had expanded
federal jurisdiction, and to consider interpreting the term “navigable
waters” more narrowly.138 On June 27, 2017, the EPA and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers signed the proposed rule that would limit
federal jurisdiction, although there was no effort to amend the states’
power under Section 401 to issue water quality certificates.139 The
White House’s proposed 2018 budget sought to eliminate the Energy
Star program, and the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Appropriations voted in the summer of 2017 to reduce the program’s

136. See supra note 56; see also infra note 144 (discussing the EPA’s intention to roll back
vehicle emissions standards).
137. Mindy Lubber, SEC Climate Risk Disclosure Effort Under Serious Attack from Congress,
FORBES (July 18, 2016, 11:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mindylubber/2016/07/18/secclimate-risk-disclosure-effort-under-serious-attack-from-congress/#249f8cc33cc2 [https://perma.
cc/W3SE-AH3L].
138. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Feb. 28, 2017).
139. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82
Fed. Reg. 34,899 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328); see also supra note
9 (noting CRA repeal of SEC rule obligation for firms in extractive industries).
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funding by 40 percent.140 The fate of that program remains to be seen.
Among vertical horcruxes, the most significant pushback has been
talk of withdrawing or revoking the current California tailpipe
emissions waiver under the Clean Air Act.141 California has received
every waiver it has applied for under the Clean Air Act except one,
when California first sought to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles.142 In 2009, however, the Obama administration granted
this waiver. Subsequently, California and the EPA reached an
agreement with the auto industry to adopt uniform rules for motor
vehicle emissions, which were also harmonized with the DOT’s rules
on new vehicle fleetwide fuel economy standards.143 Yet on April 2,
2018, the EPA Administrator announced that the current uniform
fleetwide standards are “not appropriate and should be revised.”144
Although the Clean Air Act has no statutory provision governing
revocation of a waiver, there is always the potential for the EPA simply
to deny future waiver requests. The EPA’s April 2018 announcement
stated that “cooperative federalism doesn’t mean that one state can
dictate standards for the rest of the country,” and that the EPA looked
forward to working with California, among others, on setting a uniform
standard.145 As of the date of publication, California’s waiver remains
intact. These horcruxes may not have been created with the issue of
resisting deregulatory pressure in mind. However, whether horcruxes
are more or less subject to deregulatory efforts than programs housed
solely within the EPA, whether certain types of horcruxes (vertical,
horizontal, private, shared, or external) are more or less subject to such
pressures, and which are most likely to endure, are all questions that
can be tested through empirical methods.
140. Emily Holden, White House Plans to ‘Close Out’ Energy Star, Other Programs,
CLIMATEWIRE (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060050976 [https://perma.cc/
45Y9-8RJ3]; Press Release, Appropriations Committee Approves Fiscal Year 2018 Interior and
Environment Bill (July 18, 2017), https://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?
DocumentID=395024 [https://perma.cc/5863-NV44].
141. Robinson Meyer, The Coming Clean-Air War Between Trump and California, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/trump-california-clean-airact-waiver-climate-change/518649 [https://perma.cc/6KHS-L28N].
142. Id.
143. Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the
“Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 344–45 (2015).
144. News Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Administrator Pruitt: GHG Emissions
Standards for Cars and Light Trucks Should Be Revised (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/
newsreleases/epa-administrator-pruitt-ghg-emissions-standards-cars-and-light-trucks-should-be
[https://perma.cc/46EQ-MT87].
145. Id.
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A unique question arises in the context of horizontal horcruxes,
given the structural differences across federal agencies. If the primary
federal agency and the secondary agency are both executive agencies,
then the balance of power between Congress and the president in both
creating and deregulating such programs is likely to be similar in
nature. However, if the two agencies are of different design—for
example, the primary agency is the EPA and the secondary agency is
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) or the SEC, both
of which are independent agencies, the balance of regulatory and
deregulatory power may be different.146 In addition, different types of
agencies may have different degrees of independent litigating
authority, setting up potential enforcement conflicts in the case of
shared horizontal horcruxes. Thus, further empirical research is
warranted on whether embedding a horcrux in an executive or an
independent agency renders it either more or less durable over time.
On the question of whether horcruxes promote deliberative
democracy, this too can be tested empirically. The hypothesis would be
that those seeking to create horizontal horcruxes speak in terms of
different values—beyond the environment—when advocating for such
programs to be housed in federal agencies whose missions are focused
on issues other than environmental protection. Whether such broader
framing also exists for vertical and private horcruxes remains an open
question. If programs that are framed more broadly have greater
durability, this would also yield important insights for regulators
designing programs in the future.
CONCLUSION
This systematic effort to understand the role of horcruxes makes
three contributions to the literature on strategic regulatory design and
on regulatory exit. First, it brings together insights from disparate
literatures on federalism, interagency coordination, and collaborative
governance, suggesting that there is significant value in comparing the
different horcruxes along common normative metrics. A greater
degree of fragmentation and distance from the center can harden such
horcruxes from deregulatory pressures but can likewise weaken the
ability of the regulatory program to achieve all of the same regulatory
goals. Although horizontal horcruxes are likely to be the weakest at
resisting deregulatory pressure focused on federal agencies, they will

146. Thanks to Ricky Revesz on this point.
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be strongest at addressing interstate spillovers. And private horcruxes
may be the strongest at resisting deregulatory pressure but may lack
the scope and enforcement capacity of a centralized regulatory
program. This leaves vertical horcruxes—regulatory programs
embedded in whole or in part in the states—as perhaps attaining the
best balance among the available options.
Second, this framework demonstrates that demarcation lines—
like whether a statute fits into or outside of the “environmental law
canon,”147 or whether a regulatory program is a form of “new
governance”—are orthogonal to this analytical framework that
anticipates deregulatory challenges. The Clean Water Act is
unquestionably a canonical environmental law statute, not based on a
new governance or modular approach to environmental regulation. It
was adopted during the height of federal congressional action to
protect the environment in the “environmental decade” of the 1970s.148
Yet it nonetheless contains both a horizontal horcrux that shares power
to preserve water quality between two federal agencies as well as a
vertical horcrux that gives the states power to preserve water quality as
a backstop when federal permitting decisions are insufficiently
protective of human health and the environment. Likewise, the Clean
Air Act’s delegation to the EPA to limit emissions from new motor
vehicles is unquestionably part of the environmental canon and an
example of top-down regulation rather than a form of new governance.
Yet the California waiver provision is a significant vertical horcrux that
has been crucial in the iterative development of motor vehicle
emissions standards over time, and that now arguably serves as one of
the most important backstops against federal deregulatory efforts to
reduce the stringency of vehicle emissions standards.149
Finally, although some might argue that vertical or private
horcruxes are themselves equivalent to deregulation, this Article
challenges that assumption. Vertical and private horcruxes can
preserve much of a federal regulatory program’s substance even when
the federal government wishes to exit. Given that the current
administration has indicated its intent to pull out of the Paris
147. See Aagaard, supra note 18, at 1239, 1297 (arguing that embedding environmental
programs into federal agencies other than the EPA can “offer an alternative model to the
environmental law canon”); Freeman & Farber, supra note 32, at 798–803; Lobel, supra note 32,
at 344–47.
148. See generally LETTIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT (1982)
(discussing litigation over the major environmental legislation of the 1970s).
149. See supra note 68.
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Agreement on Climate Change, many states and cities have declared
their commitments to meet the Agreement’s goals through vertical
horcruxes.150 Far from simply a fortuitous circumstance, the Paris
Agreement expressly contemplated a role for participation and
commitment by subnational governments.151 And the Clean Air Act
permits these subfederal actors to take such actions without fear of
preemption. Thus, regulatory horcruxes represent an antidote to
regulatory exit when these external constituencies support the
continuation of the regulatory program and remain publicly committed
to its terms.
Administrative law and empirical scholars should investigate the
extent to which different forms of regulatory horcruxes follow these
predicted patterns. Further empirical research in this area will yield
insights for policymakers both designing new regulatory programs and
amending existing ones.

150. See supra note 75.
151. See supra note 82.

